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Abstract 
Fare and frequency determination is essential in transit operations. In this paper, passenger demand is analysed and embodied 
under distributed passengers’ willingness to pay. The transit operator’s objective is defined as a weighted combination of 
operator’s profit and consumer surplus. The closed-form optimal solutions of transit fare and frequency are obtained in the aim of 
operator’s objective. Different cost structures of the transit system are taken into consideration concerning the marginal effect of 
passenger demand on transit operating cost. The optimal fare and frequency control strategies are then derived in response to 
a deterministic changing environment where demand fluctuations are caused by the changes of exogenous factors. For stable or 
gradually varying situations of exogenous factors, they are determined by implicit equations based on optimal solutions; while 
for abrupt changing situations, they are determined by the gradient field of the transit operator’s objective. A case study for daily 
optimal operation control of a rapid transit service is demonstrated. 
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1. Introduction 
Transit systems, as an important way of human transportation, have drawn much attention both in research and 
practice over the years. Transit operations are complicated. Different kinds of modes (e.g. airline, bus, ferry and rail) 
are operated under various environments. A universal prescription that applies in every circumstance may not exist. 
Nonetheless, there are some common features in the operation processes. An essential concern for the operator is to 
determine the most suitable fares and frequencies. 
There are already a lot of researches concentrated on transit fares and frequencies. Readers can refer to Mohring 
(1972), Nash (1978), Jansson (1980), Jansson (1993), Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2003), Pedersen (2003) and so on, 
to name a few. However, some of the studies are restricted to the supply side; some are confined in a general 
analysis which is quite abstract. Few of them comprehensively considered the exact and mutual interactions between 
fare, frequency and passenger demand. 
This paper presents another way of thinking. It tries to fill the gap and answer the following questions. First, does 
there exist closed-form optimal solutions of fare and frequency for transit operations? If there does, what kind of 
forms can they take? Second, we know that passenger demand will adapt to the changes of fare and frequency 
accordingly. How to specifically describe the adaptations? Third, we also know, on the other hand, passenger 
demand actually fluctuates all the time due to the changes of not only endogenous factors but also exogenous 
factors. How should the transit operator respond to demand fluctuations and adjust its fare and frequency? 
For the above interests and purposes, passenger demand and its relationship with fare and frequency are analysed 
in Section 2 under the assumption of distributed passengers’ willingness to pay. The closed-form optimal solutions 
in the aim of the operator’s objective are presented. In Section 3, the optimal fare and frequency control strategies 
are then derived in response to a deterministic changing environment where passenger demand fluctuations are 
caused by the changes of exogenous factors. A case study for daily optimal operation control of a rapid transit 
service is provided in Section 4, while the concluding remarks are given in Section 5. The nomenclatures used in 
this study are listed in the following text box. 
 
Nomenclature 
ܥ Operating cost of the transit  
ܨ Transit frequency (reciprocal of transit headway) 
ܲ Transit fare per capita 
ܴ Realized passenger demand rate 
܆ A vector of exogenous demand variables 
 
ܿሺǤ ሻ A function of passengers’ generalized cost of travel 
ܩሺǤ ሻ Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of willingness to pay for the group of transit passengers 
ܩҧሺǤ ሻ Complementary cumulative distribution function or tail distribution of ܩሺǤ ሻ 
݃ሺǤ ሻ Probability density function (PDF) of willingness to pay for the group of transit passengers 
ܳሺ܆ሻ Potential passenger demand rate determined by exogenous demand variables 
ݖ The objective function of the transit operator 
 
ߙ A weight parameter indicated in the operator’s objective function 
ߚ Passengers’ value of time 
ߜ A fare and frequency independent value composed of other costs of travel 
Ԅ Linear parameter associated with operating cost and transit frequency 
Ɏ Transit operator’s profit 
ɗ Consumer surplus for transit passengers 
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2. Optimal fare and frequency under distributed passengers’ willingness to pay 
2.1. Passenger demand 
Estimation of passenger demand for transit is complex mainly because they involve the aggregate behavior of 
individuals (Ceder, 2007). In general, passenger demand can be expressed as a function of passengers’ generalized 
cost of travel ܿሺǤ ሻ and a vector of exogenous demand variables ܆ (Savage, 2010): 
 , ,R q c P F ª º¬ ¼X    (1) 
However, no more information about passenger demand can be obtained from this expression alone. To further 
examine the relationship between fare, frequency and passenger demand, we impose the following assumption: 
Assumption. Each passenger has a reserved maximum amount of the generalized cost of travel, which is the 
passenger’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the transit. A passenger will turn to other transport services if the actual 
generalized cost of travel exceeds the person’s willingness to pay. 
With this assumption, passenger demand can be embodied through users’ aggregate willingness to pay. 
Endogenous factors (fare and frequency) and exogenous factors that influence passenger demand can be separated 
accordingly; and the attributes of passenger behaviours can be characterized in the demand function. 
Different passengers may have different levels of willingness to pay for the transit because of their dissimilar 
backgrounds. Let ܩሺǤ ሻ be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of willingness to pay for all passengers. When 
the number of entire passenger group is large enough, ܩሺǤ ሻ can be approximately supposed to be continuous and 
differentiable, and we assume a corresponding continuous probability density function (PDF) for the population of 
passengers, which is denoted by ݃ሺǤ ሻ. Then, 
   
0
c
G c g dT T ³    (2) 
Therefore, we can separate passengers’ generalized cost of travel from exogenous demand variables and rewrite 
Eq. (1): 
        1 ,R Q G c P F Q G cª º   ¬ ¼X X   (3) 
where ܳሺ܆ሻ is the potential passenger demand that solely depends on exogenous demand variables. 
If passengers do not know the exact transit schedule, their average waiting time is roughly ͳȀʹܨ (Jansson, 1980; 
Zhang et al., 2014), and passengers’ generalized cost of travel can be written as: 
 ,
2
c P F P
F
E G      (4) 
where β is passengers’ value of time in waiting and δ is a fare and frequency independent value composed of other 
costs. 
Normally, passengers’ value of time varies among different passengers, just like the case of passengers’ 
willingness to pay. Nevertheless, if the waiting time is not very long and the range of value of time is small, 
passengers’ actual experienced generalized costs of travel are almost the same under a given specific fare and 
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frequency. This hypothesis is strict and needs further deliberation actually. At current stage, we presume that 
a uniform value of time will not mislead us to fallacy. 
2.2. Operator’s objective 
We continue to think about the problem of transit operations from the perspective of the operator. There are many 
different kinds of objectives for transit operations in the literature, such as maximizing vehicle miles, maximizing 
passenger trips, or maximizing social welfare and so on. In this paper, we adopt an objective function with 
a weighted combination of transit operator’s profit and consumer surplus (Jørgensen and Pedersen, 2004). 
The transit operator’s profit is given by: 
P R CS       (5) 
where the first term of the right hand side is the farebox revenue and ܥ is the operating cost of the transit. In line 
with many researches (e.g. Newell, 1979; Jara-Díaz and Gschwender, 2003; van Reeven, 2008), we assume that the 
operating cost grows linearly with the transit frequency ܨ. That is 
C FI    (6) 
The consumer surplus is given by: 
     
c
c Q g d\ T T Tf ³ X    (7) 
Thus the operator’s objective can be written as: 
 max  z 1DS D \      (8) 
or in a detailed form: 
           max  z 1
c
P Q G c F c Q g dD I D T T Tfª º      ¬ ¼ ³X X   (9) 
where the parameter ߙ א ሾͲǡͳሿ. When ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ, passengers’ surplus and operator’s profit share the same weights and 
the objective becomes maximizing social welfare (Savage, 2010). 
We present the necessary first order conditions with respective to fare and frequency for optimality, which then 
yield: 
   *
2 2
Q X G c RF E EI I
     (10) 
     * 2P g c G cD D      (11) 
From (10) and (11), we get the optimal fare and frequency with respect to the objective function (9). They are the 
global optimal solutions we could achieve. 
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Eq. (10) is consistent with the famous “square root formula” (Newell, 1971; Mohring, 1972; Jannson, 1980). 
Different objective functions are assumed in these papers: Newell (1971) pursued the objective of minimizing total 
passenger waiting time, while Mohring (1972) and Jannson (1980) followed the objective of minimizing total social 
cost of passengers and the transit operator. However, none of the three papers considered the effect of fare and 
frequency on passenger demand. That is, they took an exogenously determined passenger demand function that did 
not respond to the change of endogenous factors. We have concerned the interactions among passengers and the 
transit operator, and established the connection between fare, frequency and passenger demand via the distribution 
of passengers’ willingness to pay. It is interesting to see that our model yields the same result when such interactions 
are considered. What is more, the optimal frequency is irrelevant of the parameter α, meaning that different 
objectives (e.g. maximizing transit profit or maximizing social welfare) produce the same solution. This indicates 
that the “square root formula” is truly a pervasive rule in deed. The formula also brings the “Mohring effect” that 
leads to scale economy (Mohring, 1972) and positive externality (Gómez-Lobo, 2014), which is often interpreted as 
a support for transit subsidies. 
When ߙ ് Ͳ, we obtain the optimal fare in closed-form as: 
 
 *
1
2
G c
P
g cD
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹    (12) 
The optimal fare is an increasing function with respect to α, which means if the operator puts more weights on its 
own interests, it will set a higher fare. The optimal fare should be zero when maximizing social welfare (ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ). If 
we relax the independency between operating cost and transit fare (or implicitly the passenger demand) in Eq. (6) 
and once again, compute the first order condition of operator’s objective with respect to fare, we have 
 
 *
1
2
G c CP
g c RD
w§ ·  ¨ ¸ w© ¹    (13) 
This yields the same result as exhibited by Jørgensen and Pedersen (2004) that the optimal fare should be equal to 
the costs experienced by the operator of serving a marginal passenger when maximizing social welfare. 
In addition, if the linear correlation between operating cost and transit frequency still holds, we have 
 
 * 12
g cR CF
R G c
E
I
ª ºw   « »w¬ ¼
   (14) 
which is still independent of the parameter α. The “square root formula” applies as well, but the optimal frequency 
will be a little bit greater due to the marginal operating cost with respect to passenger demand. 
3. Operation control in a deterministic changing environment 
In the previous section we focus on the effect of endogenous factors on passenger demand. The optimal fare and 
frequency will remain unchanged when the exogenous factors are fixed and the outer environment is constant. In 
fact, passenger demand fluctuates all the time due to the variation of exogenous demand variables. In the short run, 
passenger demand varies from peak hours to non-peak hours; while in the long run, passenger demand varies with 
the change of land use and residential population. 
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Fig. 1. A moving trajectory of fare and frequency to optimality. 
 
In a deterministic changing environment, the transit operator has to adjust its operation strategies in response to 
demand fluctuation with time. Only by adapting to the environment change can the operator maintain its objective 
being achieved actively. To calculate the optimal fare and frequency under exogenously changing demand 
situations, we combine the Eqs. (3), (4), (10) and (11) all together and have 
         22g c c G cQ G c
EID G Dª º     « »« »¬ ¼X
  (15) 
This implicit equation describes the relation between optimal passengers’ generalized cost of travel and potential 
passenger demand that determined by exogenous demand variables. For any given ܳሺ܆ሻ, we can find the optimality 
for ܿ by solving the above equation. With the optimal ܿ being resolved, the relations of the optimal fare ܲ and 
frequency ܨ to potential passenger demand ܳሺ܆ሻ and realized passenger demand ܴ can also be attained respectively. 
They are the control strategies of the transit operator in response to the deterministic changing environment. An 
example of such relation diagrams (Fig. 2) will be illustrated in the next section. 
The control strategies we obtain currently are applicable for stable or gradually varying situations. For situations 
where there is dramatic changes for passenger demand, the premise of using this operation control is that all the 
participants respond simultaneously and instantaneously. There is no lag for the operator and no delay for 
passengers, which is impossible in the real-world case. Approximation or adjustment methods are required during 
such processes. 
Another consideration is that passenger demand change may not be continuous. When there occurs a sudden 
jump or drop of the passenger demand, the fare and frequency calculated by optimal conditions may suffer an abrupt 
increase or decrease. This is probably unacceptable for passengers, especially for the fare price. To deal with such 
problems, we use continuous operation control to ensure smooth transformation. When the change of exogenous 
factors cause the deviation of fare and frequency from optimality, the moving trajectory of fare and frequency 
(Fig. 1) is determined by the gradient field of the operator’s objective function: 
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2
2
1
2
Q G c P g c
z Q
P g c G c
F
D D
E D D DI
§ ·ª º   ¬ ¼¨ ¸  ¨ ¸ª º   ¨ ¸¬ ¼© ¹
X
X   (16) 
so that the operator’s objective is maximized during this movement. 
4. Case study 
A rapid transit service that runs at an average speed of 60 km/hr has a unit operating cost 25 HK$/(car*km). Each 
vehicle has 8 cars with a capacity for 250 per car. During the peak hour, the operator runs all its 15 vehicles at the 
same time along the transit route at 2-minute intervals. Suppose passengers have a value of time around 20 HK$/hr, 
and passengers’ willingness to pay (HK$) is log-normally distributed: 
 2lnWTP P V    (17) 
with ߤ ൌ ʹǤͷ and ߪ ൌ ͲǤͷ . Design the optimal daily transit operations of fare and frequency for the estimated 
potential passenger demand profile given in Table 1. (Assume that ߙ ൌ ͲǤ͹ͷ and ߜ ൌ Ͳ). 
According to Eq. (6), 
25 60 8 15
6000 HK$
60 / 2
I u u u     (18) 
Table 1. Estimated potential passenger demand profile. 
Time Q(X)/hr-1 Time Q(X)/hr-1 Time Q(X)/hr-1 Time Q(X)/hr-1 
0:00 5000 6:00 10000 12:00 20000 18:00 50000 
1:00 4000 7:00 40000 13:00 30000 19:00 40000 
2:00 2000 8:00 60000 14:00 10000 20:00 20000 
3:00 1500 9:00 50000 15:00 20000 21:00 20000 
4:00 3000 10:00 40000 16:00 40000 22:00 12000 
5:00 8000 11:00 20000 17:00 50000 23:00 10000 
 
 
We first calculate the optimal passengers’ generalized cost of travel with different potential passenger demand 
from Eq. (15). Then the relations of optimal fare and frequency to potential passenger demand are plotted in Fig. 2. 
We can see that when the potential passenger demand is high (ܳሺ܆ሻ>40000/hr), the optimal fare is insensitive with 
respect to the demand change. 
Observing the demand profile, we first calculate the corresponding fare and frequency with respect to the ܳሺ܆ሻ 
values in Fig. 2 and expand each time point to 40mins interval. The moving trajectories to ensure smooth 
transformation are used during other time periods. The final operation control plan is drawn in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 2. ܨ െ ܳሺ܆ሻ and ܲ െ ܳሺ܆ሻ diagrams. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Daily optimal fare and frequency control plan. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this study, passenger demand in transit operations is analysed and embodied under distributed passengers’ 
willingness to pay. With such assumption, endogenous and exogenous factors that influence passenger demand are 
separated. The attributes of potential passenger behaviours can be characterized in the demand function with 
willingness to pay distribution and generalized cost of travel. 
The closed-form optimal solutions of transit fare and frequency are obtained in the aim of the transit operator’s 
objective with a weighted combination of operator’s profit and consumer surplus. Different cost structures of the 
transit system are taken into consideration concerning the marginal effect of passenger demand on transit operating 
cost. The optimal frequency is consistent with the famous “square root formula”. Absent from operating costs of 
serving a marginal passenger, the optimal fare will be zero when maximizing social welfare. 
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In practice, the distribution of passengers’ willingness to pay can be collected and depicted from users’ stated 
preference or revealed preference data. It builds a linkage that connects passengers, transit operator and the society. 
For passengers themselves, willingness to pay is a representation of their own economic capabilities and the 
distribution reflects the aggregate behaviour properties of individuals using the transit service; for the transit 
operator, the distribution function is a mirror of the competiveness against other transportation modes; for the 
society, it is a reflection of the macroeconomic environment. 
We further discuss the transit operation control in a deterministic changing environment. The optimal fare and 
frequency control strategies are derived in response to passenger demand fluctuation that caused by the changes of 
exogenous factors. For stable or gradually varying situations of exogenous factors, they are determined by implicit 
equations based on the solutions of optimal fare and frequency under distributed passengers’ willingness to pay; 
while for abrupt changing situations, they are determined by the gradient field of the operator’s objective function. 
A case study for daily optimal operation control of a rapid transit service is demonstrated. 
The current model has some limitations and seeds the chances for future extensions. The heterogeneity of 
passengers’ value of time should be considered. The forms of generalized cost of travel and operating cost can be 
modified or relaxed concerning other characteristics of passengers and the operator. The one line one origin-
-destination transit system can be extended to multiple stops, lines and networks. It also leads to other branches of 
the transportation study, such as: 
x Subsidization for the operator. Transit services play a significant role around the world over the past decades 
(Wachs, 1989; Hess and Lombardi, 2005) but only a few Asian cities are able to operate their transit services 
without financial support from governments (Elgar and Kennedy, 2005). Apart from the frequently cited 
justification from Mohring effect that causes scale economy and positive externalities, this paper shows another 
support for the necessity of subsidy when the regulator desires to alter the behavior of private transit operator and 
elevate social welfare. More details waits to be investigated about transit subsidization; 
x Dynamic pricing of the transit. The fare control scheme presented in this paper is time dependent but 
deterministic. Stochastic features of passenger demand and system uncertainties should also be included when 
considering flexible fare strategies. The issues of price discrimination and other public concerns cannot be 
ignored; 
x Fully automation of transit operation. A fully automatic transit system not only manipulate itself like the well 
implemented driverless automated guideway transit, but also respond to the environment adaptively. To achieve 
this goal, detections of passenger demand in real-time and the dynamic control of fare and frequency are needed. 
Self-learning will be welcome in the stochastic and uncertain circumstances. 
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